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BLACK & MOORE 
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salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: 363-2727 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CAROL STARR, Mother of 
RONALD DEAN BRODERICK, 
deceased, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, PEPSI COLA BOTTLING 
COMPANY and STATE INSURANCE 
FUND, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Case No: 16378 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT STATE INSURANCE FUND 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the final order of the Industrial 
Commission of Utah denying the appellant compensation benefits for 
the death of her son on the basis of the Commission's finding 
that she was not a dependent of her son within the meaning of 
the Workmen's Compensation Act. 
DISPOSITION BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
A hearing was held in this matter before Administrative 
Law Judge Keith E. Sohm who found that the applicant was not 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
a dependent of the decedent as defined by the Workmen's 
Compensation Act. The Industrial Commission thereafter order,. 
the respondent insurance carrier to pay the sum of $15, 600 to 
the Special Fund pursuant to Section 35-1-68 Utah Code Annota:; 
which provides that in the case of an industrial injury causir.: 
death where the deceased has no dependents benefits are to 
be paid to the Special Fund. The defendant was also ordered 
to pay burial expenses for the deceased in the statutory amoum 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Respondent respectfully requests the Court to affirn 
the order of the Industrial Commission. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Ronald Dean Broderick, the decedent, was employed as a 
driver by the Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company and died on June 25, 
1978 as a result of injuries be sustained in a collision 
which occurred in the course of his employment. 
At the time of his death, the decedent was 22' years old, 
unmarried and living at home with his mother, stepfather, 
five brothers and sisters and two stepbrothers and sisters. 
(R. 16). He earned approximately $1000 a month (R. 23) of 
which he contributed to his mother, according to her testimon· 
$100 a month in cash for his own room and board. The appellrl 
employed at the time earning $6,4444 a year (R. 19) and her 
husband was employed earning $11,500 a year. (R. 21) One 
of the appellant's other sons was employed earning minimum 
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wages which he spent for his own school clothes and needs 
(R. 24). 
The decedent had given his mother $200 to buy a micro-
wave oven shortly before his death which the appellant testified 
she would have been able to purchase anyway (R. 18-19). 
she also testified that she thought she and her husband could 
have purchased things, bought food and done things on the 
same basis without the money contributed by her son. (R. 19) 
She stated that she was not so much dependent on the money 
her son contributed as she was dependent on him personally. 
(R. 22) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE APPELLANT WAS NOT DEPENDENT ON THE DECEASED FOR 
FINANCIAL SUPPORT AND IS NOT ENTITLED TO COMPENSATION FOR 
HIS DEATH. 
By her own testimony, the appellant was not a dependent of 
the decedent within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation 
Act. 
Section 35-1-71 Utah Code Annotated 1953 as amended 1977 
provides that minor children and surviving spouses are presumed 
to be dependents of a deceased worker. The statute further 
provides that 
In all other cases, the question 
of dependency in whole or in part, 
shall be determined in accordance 
with the facts in each particular 
case existing at the time of injury 
or death. 
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This Court frequently has considered the question of 
dependency in claims which are not subject to the statutory 
presumption. Recently, the Court reitterated the legal test 
which has consistently been applied in cases such as this one. 
In Farnsworth v. Industrial Commission, 534 P.2d 897 
(Utah 1975), a case in which a father claimed dependency on 
his son, Justice Maughan quoted the rule as stated by the Court 
in Rigby v. Industrial Commission, 75 Utah 454, 458, 286 
P. 628 (1930) 
To entitle plaintiff to compensation in this case, 
it must affirmatively be made to appear that at 
the time of the injury (1) plaintiff relied upon 
his son, in whole or in part, for his support and 
maintenance; (2) that had the son not been killed 
plaintiff would in all probability have received 
some assistance from his son: (3) that it was 
reasonably necessary for the son to render his 
father some financial aid in order that the father 
might continue to live in a condition suitable 
and becoming to his station in life. 
The Court in Farnsworth summarized the relevant principle 
by observing that dependency within the terms of the statute 
means 
that the applicant looked to and relied on the 
contributions of the workman, in whole or in part, 
as a means of supporting and maintaining himself 
in accordance with his social position and 
accustomed mode of life. 
The appellant's testimony before the Commission establisr.: 
the validity of the Commission's finding that she was not 
dependent upon her son for support. She admits that his 
contributions were made for his own room and board, that she 
could have maintained the same standard of living without hi5 
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contributions, and that her real dependency on her son was 
for emotional support. 
The appellant gave the following testimony in response to 
questioning from her counsel. 
Q And were any funds being paid by 
your son to you? 
A He paid a hundred dollars a month 
that was for his room and board. 
It is well established that payments made by a decedent 
for his own living expenses are not contributions to his 
family's support. In Utah Fuel Co. v. Industrial Commission, 67 
Utah 25, 245 P. 381, 386 (1926) a mother applied for benefits 
as a dependent of a deceased son who lived at home on the basis 
of contributions made by him to the family. This Court ruled 
that the cost of the decedent's own support should be deducted 
from the amount he regularly tendered his mother to determine 
the contribution from which dependency could be established. 
"The commission should have carefully considered 
the cost of maintaining the deceased son in connection 
with the cost of maintaining the whole family, and 
should also have considered to what extent he 
assisted his mother in maintaining the household 
and the pecuniary benefits, * * * and should 
have determined the monetary value of all the 
foregoing elements, and, after doing that, it 
should have deducted the actual cost of main-
tenance therefrom, and the difference remaining, 
if any, should have been taken as the basis for 
fixing the amount of the award." 
This is the general rule as reported by Professor Larsen in 
Larsen Workmen's Compensation Law §63.12, p. 11-68 and §63.22, 
p. ll-82. 
-5-
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... it has frequently been held that, 
if the decedent's contribution is offset by 
the value of board and room received, he is 
doing no more than to 'pull his own weight'; 
he is merely supporting himself, with nothing 
left over to represent support of dependents. 
. . . the key fact is that the same event which 
deprives the claimant parent of a source of 
income also removes a source of expense. 
In the instant case no evidence was received about the 
value of the decedent's board and room. However, the applicar.: 
herself testified that the payment by the decedent of $100 a 
month was "for his room and board." Undoubtedly the decedent'. 
room and board could be valued at $100 a month, if not more, 
The Court has noted that where the Commission makes no 
findings about the cost of the decedent's maintenance, this 
Court may do so by inference from the record. Utah Fuel Co. 
v. Industrial Commission, supra; Park Utah Consol. Mines co. 
v. Industrial Commission, 84 Utah 81, 36 P.2d 979 (1934). 
Such an evaluation in this instance compels the conclusion thrl 
decedent's $100 monthly contribution is offset in whole or in 
substantial part by the value of his own room and board. 
This view of the nature of the· decedent's contributions .. 
corroborated by the appellant's testimony in response to 
questioning about the focal issue of her claim. 
Q This particular money that you received from 
your son, if you were not to receive it, if 
he hadn't given you this hundred dollars a 
month plus the extras, would you have been 
able to live an [sic] purchase things and 
buy food and do things on the same basis 
without that money? 
A Yes. It would have been harder but I 
think we could have. (R. 19) 
-6-
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Earlier, the appellant stated that her son had purchased 
their family a microwave oven before he died. On that subject 
she testified as follows: 
A . . two weeks before he died he gave 
me his two hundred dollars out of his 
last paycheck. 
Q What did he give you that for? 
A To buy me a stove. 
Q Would you have been able to buy this stove 
if he hadn't given you the $200? 
A Yes, but we just hadn't done it. (R. 18) 
The appellant testified that she and her husband would aave 
been able to purchase things, buy food and do things on the 
same basis without the room and board money they received from 
her son. She testified that even luxury items like a microwave 
oven could have been acquired as easily without the occasional 
gifts she received from her son. She has, in effect, directly 
admitted that her son's contributions were not necessary for 
her own support and that her family could have lived in the 
style to which they were accustomed without his contributions. 
In view of the fact the appellant and her husband had a 
combined income of nearly $19,000 at the time of the accident it 
is not surprising that she would admit that her sons payments 
were not needed to maintain them in their usual style of life. 
In Hancock v. Industrial Commission, 58 Utah 192, 198 P.169 
(1921) this Court ruled that contributions by a deceased son 
to his parents which averaged $25.00 a month did not establish 
-7-
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• 
dependency in whole or in part because his father's inco~e 
of $100 a month was sufficient for his family's usual style 
life. 
By her own admission, the appellant cannot satisfy the;, 
criteria of dependency in fact. 
In truth, the appellant's dependency on her son was of 
another variety, one which undoubtedly made his loss the more 
profound but one for which the law of Workmen's Compensation 
affords no remedy. 
Q Carol, looking back in this situation and 
prior to the time that your son was in this 
accident, did you feel that you were somewhat 
dependent upon the money that came to 
the household from him? 
A Not so much the money as I was on him. 
When his father was killed, Ron was 11 years 
old so we were dependent on each other. He 
was always there when I needed him. 
The case of Farnsworth v. Industrial Commission, supra, 
closely resembles the case at bar in this regard. The applk· 
was blind and relied on his 19 year old son for support and 
services such as reading him his mail, driving him to medical 
appointments and on other errands, and performing yard work 
and chores around the house. In ruling that contributions o:. 
this sort did not create a dependency which is compensable 
under the Act, the Court concluded 
In the instant action, the assistance 
rendered by decedent to his father was not 
comparable to financial assistance to maintain 
him in his accustomed station in life. It was 
greater, it was the love, affection, and companior· 
ship of a dutiful child; and deserving of the 
highest comendation. 
-8-
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Such assistance, as is here shown, commendable 
as it is, does not establish dependency within the 
Workmen's Compensation Act, the purpose of which 
is to provide compensation for the probable 
financial loss suffered by dependents on account 
of the death of the decedent. 
The Commission did not err in finding that the appellant 
was not a dependent of her deceased son, substantial evidence 
supports their conclusion and there is no basis in the record 
for reversing the order entered. 
POINT II 
THE DENIAL OF BENEFITS TO THE APPELLANT IS CONSISTENT 
WITH THE PURPOSE OF THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT AND THE 
UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
The appellant contends that since the Workmen's Compensation 
Act was enacted to benefit workers and their families the denial 
of benefits to the appellant and the award of benefits to the 
Special Fund pursuant to Section 35-1-68 Utah Code Annotated 
was contrary to the purpose of the Act. She also contends that 
since Article XVI Section 5 of the Constitution of Utah provides 
that the right to an action for wrongful death shall not be 
abrogated except where compensation is provided for by law, she 
is guaranteed the right to compensation for her son's death or 
a right of action against his employer for wrongful death. Both 
contentions are completely without merit. 
The purpose of the Workmen's Compensation Act in providing 
benefits in cases of death was reviewed by this Court in 
the case of Farnsworth v. Industrial Commission, supra, discussed 
earlier. As noted, Justice Maughan stated that the purpose 
of the Act 
is to provide compensation for the probable 
financial loss sufferred by dependents on 
account of the death of the decedent. 
(Emphasis Added) 
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Farnsworth, supra, 534 P.2d at 900. The authority cited by 
the appellant in her discussion about the original intent of 
the Act is to the same effect. The appellant quotes from the 
Court's statement in Utah Copper Company v. Industrial Commiss• 
----:.:.· 
193 P. 24 (Utah 1920) wherein the Court also explains that 
benefits were intended in cases of death for dependents only, 
a Commission was created primarily to enable 
injured employees, or dependents of such emhloyees 
when death ensues to obtain such relief wit out 
delay and without having to resort to the 
uncertainties and expenses of litigation. (emphasis 
added) 
The very question raised by the appellant was the subject 
of a decision by this Court in the case of Henrie v. Rocky 
Mountain Packing Corporation, 113 U 415, 196 P.2d 487 (19481 
rehearing denied, 113 U. 444, 202 P.2d 727. That action was 
brought by a non-dependent father who was denied death benefi:•i 
the Industrial Commission and sued his son's employer for 
wrongful death. Explaining the purpose of the compensation 
scheme in death cases, Justice Wolfe observed that 
The intention of the Acts, then was to secure 
workmen and their de~endents (not heirs or 
personal representatives) against becoming objects 
of charity, by making reasonable compensation for 
calamities incidental to the employment and to 
make human wastage in industry part of the cost 
of production. (Emphasis Original) 
Henrie, supra, 196 P.2d at 493. 
The denial of benefits to the appellant and the payment 
of benefits to the Special Fund is in no way inconsistent 
with the purpose of the Workmen's Compensation Act. 
The Act compensates those who were dependent in fact 
-10- .. 
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on the decedent for support for actual financial losses just 
as in all its other provisions the Act attempts to compensate 
actual pecuniary losses. Non-dependent survivors are not 
persons whom the benefits of Workmen's Compensation were 
intended to reach and an award of benefits to a non-dependent 
would contradict the whole purpose and scheme fo the Act. And, 
as the appellant has been denied nothing to which she is 
entitled, she has no standing to complain that the legislature 
chose to finance the Special Fund by requiring payments to it 
where no dependents survive a deceased worker. 
The appellant contends, additionaly, that since Article 1 
Section 5 of the Constitution prohibits abrogation of the right 
to bring an action for wrongful death, "except where compensation 
for injuries resulting in death is provided for by law," 
she is entitled to death benefits or to an independent 
action for wrongful death against her son's employer. 
The question whether the Commission's order denying the 
appellant death benefits bars an action against the defendant 
employer for wrongful death is not properly before the Court. It 
is axiomatic that on appeal from an order of the Industrial 
Commission this Court acquires jurisdiction solely to determine 
the lawfulness of the Commission's order, Section 35-1-84, Utah 
Code Annotated, and its collateral effect can only be determined 
in another forum. The appellant apparently suggests, however, 
that the constitutional provision referred to in some way affects 
the validity of the Commission's denial of benefits to her and 
alternative award to the Special Fund. 
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This issue was directly presented in the case of Henrie 
-----=-::.__:_: 
Rocky Mountain Packing Corporation, supra, discussed above. 
noted, an action for wrongful death against his son's employ~ 
was brought by a non-dependent father who was denied benefits: 
the Commission. The defendant employer contended that the 
action was barred by his payment of benefits to the Commission 
and payment of the decedent's burial expenses. The plaintiff 
argued, as does the appellant in the instant action, that 
Article XVI Section 5 of the Utah Constitution prohibited 
abrogation of his right to sue for wrongful death where he 
had been denied death benefits, and that he was entitled to 
benefits in one forum or the other. 
The Court in Henrie agreed with the defendant employer 
that the action was barred and construed the limiting provisio~ 
Article 1 Section 5, "except where compensation for injuries i:: 
is provided for by law," to mean that a right of action 
against an employer for wrongful death can be barred by the 
legislature whenever the death is one which subjects the 
employer to the compensation obligations of the Workmen's 
Compensation Act. In other words, the legislature is empowerec 
to substitute the compensation scheme as a whole for the 
common law action for wrongful death against an employer. 
Given that power, the legislature is at liberty within the 
compensation system to deny death benefits to non-dependents 3' 1 I 
it did by Section 35-1-73 while barring the non-dependent fro:; 
bringing an action for wrongful death as it did by Section id 
without infringing on the non-dependent's constitutional riF 
by either limitation. The payment by the employer of buria: 
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expenses and benefits to the state treasury pursuant to the 
requirements of the Act is the providing of compensation which 
brings the case within the exception to Article XVI Section 5, 
as Justice Wolfe explained, even though neither payment directly 
benefits the non-dependent survivor. 
Plaintiff contends that because the money 
paid by defendant or its insurance carrier into 
the state treasury did not benefit him, it was not 
compensation within the meaning of Article XVI, 
Section 5 of the Constitution. Viewed in the light 
of the history of that section of the Constitution 
and of the Workmen's Compensation legislation, the 
contention is untenable. The amendment to the 
Constitution was not designed or intended to preserve 
all of the rights formerly guaranteed, and also 
to create new rights. On the contrary its very 
purpose was to abrogate some of the rights 
formerly held by persons entitled to sue under 
the wrongful death statute. "Compensation", as 
used in the amendment to the Constitution, means 
the same as it is used and defined in the compensation 
act, i.e. any payment required by the act to be made to a 
workman or to his dependents, or for their benefit, 
or into the state treasury for the special purposes 
of the compensation act. This includes disability 
payments, death benefits, medical and hospitalization 
expenses, burial expenses, and payments into the 
state treasury as provided by the act. Compensation 
does not connote or require payment to, or for 
the direct benefit of a non-dependent parent, who 
would have been able to maintain an action for 
wrongful death prior to the amendment to the state 
Constitution. The payment of part of decedent's 
burial expenses and of $1,000 in the state treasury 
in accordance with the order of the Industrial 
Commission, and as provided by statute, was payment 
of "compensation" within the meaning of Article XVI, 
Section 5, of the Constitution. Plaintiff has 
no constitutional or statutory right to maintain 
this action. 
Henrie, supra, 196 P.2d at 493. 
In summary, there is no merit to the appellant's contention 
that the Commission's order violates the spirit and purpose 
of the compensation Act. Its purpose is to compensate 
-13-
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workers and their dependents for actual financial losses 
and the CollUllission found that the appellant has sustained no 
compensable financial loss as a result of her son's death. 
Likewise, there is no merit to her contention that Article xv: 
Section 5 guarantees her compensation benefits or a right 
of action against the employer for damages as this Court 
I 
has ruled that the provision allows the legislature to substitu· 
I 
the payment of compensation benefits for the wrongful death 
action against the employer even where the compensation 
benefits do not directly benefit the survivors. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant and her family were not dependents of the 
decedent because their own income was sufficient to maintain t~.E 
in their accustomed style of life. The decedent's contributior.' 
were not needed for his family's support and represented paymc 
of his own living expenses. The appellant's testimony provides 
a substantial basis for the CollUllission' s finding and there is 
no contrary evidence in the record which would justify a 
reversal of the order entered. 
A denial of benefits to a non-dependent does not violate 
the purpose of the Act but is, in fact, mandated by the theory 
of Workmen's Compensation. The statutory manner of supportin~ 
of the Special Fund by payments from employers in cases of dea: 
where no dependents survive does not affect the appellant's r;:" 
and is a reasonable exercise of legislative discretion. 
The appellant's right to bring a wrongful death action 
against the decedent's employer is not in issue on this arpe 5 
-14-
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35 it can only be tested by the collateral action itself. 
However, this Court has ruled that Atricle XVI, Section 5 of 
the Utah Constitution allows the Workmen's Compensation Act 
to be substituted for a wrongful death action against an 
employer and that non-dependents are deprived of no constitutional 
right by their statutory ineligibility for death benefits. 
Respectfully submitted this day of September, 1979. 
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